While Tarnished Brass deals with the Somalia affair
incidentally and incompletely, Scapegoat deals
with it primarily and thoroughly. Kyle Brown might have been a minor character
in the story if not for the fact that circumstances came together so perfectly
to mark him out as the opportune fall guy for a mission that misfired. When the
man mostly responsible for the death of a detainee put himself out of legal
reach by disabling his mind in a failed attempt at suicide, Trooper Brown
became the natural choice for shouldering the blame. This, for two reasons: he
confessed to punching the prisoner, and he was the lowest ranked soldier who
had been involved in the united abuse.
Canadian
airborne soldiers deployed to Somalia
in 1992-1993 in order, not to keep
peace (the usual Canadian task), but to impose
it (p. 82.) A mandate to impose peace falls outside of what the Prime Minister
of Canada, without sanction from Parliament, is allowed to issue to our troops
(p. 295.) If this book has that detail right, then the man who should have been
held responsible for misdeeds in Somalia is then Prime Minister
Mulroney. The object from the top seems to have been to commit Canadian troops
as ‘U.S.
auxiliaries’ (p. 296) but to make it appear as if they were being sent as
peacekeepers (p. 66.) Bypassing Parliament must have been crucial to bypassing
opposition to the plan (p. 303.) The mission seems to have been named Operation
Deliverance only after the troops were in Somalia (p. 68.) In keeping with
the rename and actual mission, blue berets and UN flashes had to be stowed (p.
297.) It seems that the paratroopers did not find out what they were getting
into or what they were going to Somalia
to specifically do until they were en route (p. 73.) They had not even received
maps of the area they were to occupy (p. 81), nor any adequate intelligence to
speak of (p. 299.) Once on the ground the regiment was situated, not according
to the usual formation it had been trained to adopt for defensive reasons, but
in such a way that left its constituent parts vulnerable (pp. 88, 89.) As for
rules of engagement, they ‘changed all the time’ (p. 91.) At best, they were
written in such a way as to be incomprehensible (p. 101.) Hard to believe, but
this is normative. I recall the confusion we were in before going to Cyprus on that
very issue, notwithstanding the fact that that rotating tour had been in force
for twenty-seven years by then. Rules for engaging the enemy or hostile persons
are typically vague and imprecise in order for bureaucrats to have a hatch
through which to escape responsibility for what troops do based on their orders
(pp. 101, 301.) Due to lack of courage, commitment, and clarity in Ottawa, then, our
soldiers had to improvise their own rules of engagement. So the Airborne
commander thought best, under the circumstances, to okay ‘disabling shots’ in
cases of necessity (p. 298.) In addition, and at some point during the mission,
the ‘unwritten policy’ that trickled down was to ‘rough up’ infiltrators to
discourage thieving from compounds in which supplies were kept (p. 98.) And
Major Seward issued an order to ‘abuse’ Somalis of that sort in order to
prevent them from being shot, “as the colonel had said was permissible” (p.
113.) So Major Seward’s authorization “showed individual initiative when there
were no adequate orders…Colonel Mathieu’s orders to shoot infiltrators again
reflect absence of policy” (p. 303.) Unsurprisingly, in the absence of clearly
defined guidelines, a free-for-all spirit may be expressed as well. Captain
Rainville: “If we should happen to shoot a Somali tonight, I’ll buy a case of
beer” (p. 273.)
Bear in mind,
now, the summary: a mission without approval from Parliament; no intelligence
gathering for the troops; vulnerable formation of companies on the ground in a
war zone; and rules of engagement that are so cryptic that the soldiers might
hesitate to shoot when they should, or shoot when they should not. Yes, bear
that in mind in light of the following: the possibility of uniting 100,000
militia against you because of your mandate to disarm a people whose society is
rooted in the love of arms (pp. 297, 298); Pakistani troops had suffered
twenty-four casualties and thirty-four injuries by them; and even the America’s
Rangers had lost eighteen of their best by the same (p. 72.) Only one Canadian
was shot and killed during the Somalia
mission, and that was ‘accidentally…by a comrade’ (p. 299.) Illicit politics
and bureaucratic negligence might have been the cause of death to hundreds of
elite Canadian troops. That, certainly, is the story that almost was.
A few other
Somalis were killed by the Canadians besides the one for whose death Kyle Brown
went to prison. Shidane Arone died as a detainee after he was tortured, and the
evidence for it could not be contained. This is the difference. On the one
hand, Trooper Brown was being told by a corporal to shut up and get rid of the
incriminating pictures (p. 140.) On the other hand, even the NCO’s were told by
his platoon commander to divulge all they knew if the affair ever led to an
inquiry (p. 138.)
The torture
and death of a sixteen-year-old detainee was the central event that prompted
officials to launch the Somalia
inquiry. It would not be going too far to say that this one event was
tantamount to the airborne jumping blind into oblivion. Persons who see no need
for a country to have commandos at the ready will agree that a regiment with a
clean reputation should be abolished at the first sign of dirt. More thoughtful
persons, however, will acknowledge that a country has a need for commandos to
call upon, in spite of a potential for imperfection.
The Somali
who was to die while in detention was caught on March 16th, the nite
before the ‘smoker,’ or regimental birthday bash (p. 117.) It is interesting
that this day was even celebrated by 2 Commando, given the loyalty shift from
PPCLI to Airborne at the moment of posting to the latter (p. 118.) Celebrations
began on the nite before the party. The beer flowed among off-duty soldiers,
while those on duty began to guard in shifts of one instead of two.
“Temporarily, no one was in charge” (p. 160.) Details such as these are what
made the situation precarious for the repeat infiltrator. Impromptu visits were
made to the bunker out of curiosity. The periodic abuse by this solider and
that soldier was not computed, with the direst result for the detainee. Drugs
contributed to this outcome as well as booze. The principal abuser, Master
Corporal Matchee, might have been high on marijuana at the time (p. 126.) The
more consequential drug was the one the soldiers were prescribed: mefloquine.
This anti-malaria drug gave rise to side effects like ‘hallucinations,
depression, and paranoia’ (p. 79.) Even the normally sensitive Brown, who did
not enjoy ‘kicking in people’s doors’ (p. 91) had a ‘hair-trigger temper’ under
the influence of it (p. 220.) The lead doctor from the surgical team confessed
to having ‘unreasonable anger’ and ‘weird ideas’ while on mefloquine (Ibid.)
The drug was responsible for one case of ‘psychiatric repatriation’ (p. 221.)
Mefloquine may help to explain why the warrant officer, contrary to his nature,
flipped out and delivered ‘soccer kicks’ to the prisoner’s head (pp. 124, 125,
127, 269, 270.) Some guys in another platoon did stuff like “walking naked with
their bloody gun after taking the stupid pills” (p. 227.) Corporal Kafka: “In
my professional opinion, guys who take mefloquine should not have a gun because
it’s mood altering” (Ibid.) Picture the scene in the film Young Guns when the
gunslingers dabbled in mescaline, and you have an apt illustration by which to
understand more perfectly. Is it reasonable to suppose that soldiers on mind-altering
mefloquine will behave soberly and control their alcohol intake? especially
given the heat and stress they are under? and with nothing, maybe, but their
field rations to eat? The aircrew was advised against taking the drug. But
mefloquine was deemed alright for “soldiers in combat zones carrying loaded
weapons” (p. 221.) Yes, a lot of dereliction contributed to ending this young
Somali’s life. The dereliction originated in Ottawa.
How much the
drug contributed to other moments of incompetence and irresponsibility is hard
to say. There was the embarrassing ambush during which no bandits were
apprehended and the men almost ended up shooting each other (p. 108, 109.)
There was the time when the CO and the RSM were spotted staggering around drunk
while their soldiers were engaged in a firefight in exactly the same area (pp.
83-85.) Incidents like that one pretty much killed the policy of off-duty
sobriety in the platoons, which became another factor leading to trouble in the
ranks.
Master Corporal Matchee was the
chief abuser of Arone. Trooper Brown was the man who released the photos of the
abuse (to Captain Sox, p. 146.) Brown: “My own well-being was no longer a
factor—what would happen to me didn’t matter any more. I had to tell the truth
as I saw it” (p. 145.) Again, “I won’t always have to answer to the army, but
I’ll always have to answer to the man in the mirror” (p. 143.) Ten times more
honorable than your average politician, this man! It may be true that the
Vandoos were unfairly favored over the RCR and PPCLI when a Vandoo CO was
chosen to lead the three commando companies, as Brown says (p. 65.) But
Lieutenant-Colonel Mathieu, in spite of his later faults (like the drunken
incident with his RSM), did a wise move before deploying the men under his
command. He asked his senior NCO’s which men, NCO’s, and even officers they
thought unfit for the upcoming mission. Some of the soldiers who were singled
out in this way were sent back to their original regiments, while some others,
in spite of being singled out for the same reason, were allowed to go on to
Somalia. Whether it was the CO who allowed this, or whether his recommendation
to disallow was overruled, is unclear. Two soldiers who were flagged but who
deployed anyway were Matchee and Brown, one because he was too mean, the other
because he was too passive. This questionnaire by the CO to his senior NCO’S is
called ‘misguided democracy’ and an ‘abdication of responsibility’ by the
authors (p. 68.) The fact is, though, a senior NCO knows the soldiers and has
seen them work and interact, while the CO, especially one newly nominated to
command a battalion, has no idea what character traits embody the men under his
charge. A senior NCO, more than any other rank, is in touch with the rest of the
platoon. His input is wisely sought. Brown loved the thrill of being in a
combat zone (pp. 75, 91.) Patrols there were akin to a ‘mystical experience’
for him (p. 77.) And his winsome ways with the Somalis enabled him to be
particularly successful in seizing weapons from them (p. 89.) Conversely, as
for rummaging through huts in search of weapons, Brown says, “I was doing this
and suddenly I couldn’t do it any more” (p. 90.) No one, based on the reading
of a book about the mission, should want to pass judgment on whether or not
Brown ought to have stayed behind. But Warrant Murphy’s recommendation to pass
Brown by is intriguing, maybe telling. That Matchee, the crazy Cree, should
have been sent somewhere else is beyond question. Whether or not Brown should
have been overlooked for the mission, it is still true that he might have been
the one to save the day if only he had been listened to. The ins and outs of
this mission are like rolls of concertina wire tangled. My large review is to
the purpose of unraveling as much as I can.
It says on page 119 that Brown
was the only one who tried to get a senior rank to stop the abuse before death
would ensue. It is obvious why this was done “by way of conveying his own
uneasiness than of asking for help or intervention” (p. 129) since the abuse of
detainees was a de facto order and some NCO’s had participated in the abuse. At
one point, Brown did have a serious talk with a sergeant about the prisoner
potentially being killed by Matchee. That sergeant seems to have been aware
that such an outcome would mean ‘big-time’ trouble for them, and he promised
Brown that he’d deal with it (pp. 134, 135.) He failed to follow through on
that. To Brown’s credit, not only did he ask for help, but he diverted Matchee
for a while by agreeing to take pictures of him posing with the prisoner, and
he relieved the prisoner insofar as the circumstances would permit.
Given all that these troops had
to deal with and put up with, it is commendable that they showed such restraint
toward the ungrateful Somalis who robbed them, tried to kill them, and
destroyed the infrastructure that was put in for the benefit of their town (p.
106.) Canadian soldiers did a lot of good works for the Somalis who lashed out
in return (p. 92, 177.) The Canadians could have given in to the Somali custom
of cutting off the hands of robbers. In fact, the Somali ‘police commissioner’
urged them to kill some thieves as a lesson to the rest (p. 107.) The Canadians
could have gotten away with that. But they resisted, and showed mercy instead.
When did we hear that side of the story on the news? Never. Four commandos from
the company connected to Arone’s death (2 Commando) received medals for bravery
during Operation Deliverance (p. 178.) Did we hear about that on the news? Not likely.
The pictures that Brown took of
the tortured body of Arone made up part one of the excuse used to disband the
airborne. Part two was the video that was made by a member of 2 Commando which
Brown had made copies of to distribute to ‘individual soldiers’ (p. 241.) Scott
Taylor of Esprit de Corps magazine,
obtained a copy from Trooper Brown or from Sergeant Bolan (it is disputed from
whom, p. 243.) Taylor
released the video to the CBC. The CBC ignored all the content that showed
soldiers being good fellows and hard workers (p. 241), and chose to broadcast
only the few colorful remarks that some soldiers had made for fun. Liberal
pundits exaggerated how much the public was offended by what they heard. It was
probably clear to many that the remarks had been ripped out of context to make
the soldiers look like racists and fiends. The Liberals (or Ezra Levant’s
‘Libranos’) were in power by then, and, hating everything that smacked of
machismo and testosterone, jumped at the chance to use the Somalia affair to
cut from Canada one more expression of manliness (pp. 246, 247.)
If a few jests or remarks (‘ain’t
shot enough nig-gahs yet,’ p. 242) are going to be the standard for disbanding
institutions, there is no institution anywhere that will be able to stand.
Nearly every single adult Canadian has spoken as disparagingly as that about
some person, group, or race. Natives call whites ‘whiteys’ on a regular basis.
We put up with that. Blacks call us ‘crackers.’ We put up with that. But when
white soldiers who are trying to serve their country (without proper supports
and to benefit ungrateful blacks) engage in a little verbal banter to release
some bit of stress, they get their regiment disbanded! There are racist
elements in this country, alright! There are many among us who are racist
against the white race! Master Corporal Matchee was an Indian who was racist
toward whites and blacks (pp. 88, 140, 142.) The white soldiers, rather than
‘accidentally’ kill him or swarm him, which could easily have been done, chose
to put up with him. Why? Because they were more tolerant than racist. We who
are white Canadians are so brainwashed into disregarding racism against us by
visible minorities that we miss mentioning such instances even in our quest to
defend ourselves against the charge of racism. Case in point: the index in this
book contains the heading, ‘Racism in the army.’ Each page that is cited there
is about instances by which white soldiers might be construed as racist. But
the pages containing information on Matchee’s racism are not listed. That was
not an intentional omission, for the omission works against one of the purposes
of this book: to show that, when it comes to racism, it’s prejudicial to accuse
white people alone of being guilty of it (p. 279.) The omission happened
automatically without notice because of this principal that everyone has had
planted in his mind by our culture that instances of racism by minorities ought
to be overlooked. We have been lobotomized to regard racism only when white
people are guilty of it. Indeed, you can’t even judge a visible minority when
he deserves to be judged. If you do, you’re called a racist. Liberal-minded
media and leftist politicians practice racism more than anyone else does. They
look the other way when whites are being defamed. That’s racist. They allow and
even encourage the belittling of whites. That’s racist. And they use every
innocuous gibe made by whites (except by liberal whites) against persons of
other races to further ‘progressive’ policy. While on exercise, and in my own
platoon in 1989, some Nazi symbols got painted on one of our armored carriers
just for fun. No one in the platoon was a Nazi. No one in the platoon was a
Nazi sympathizer. This is the kind of thing that real men do to cope in the
field and to keep the morale up. The comments on the video were no more done in
seriousness than was the painting of that Nazi symbol on our carrier. These
comments were for nothing but the lifting of morale. The CBC did a racist faux pas one time when it broadcast, and
later laughed at, certain uneducated American southerners who kept saying the
word ‘bloody’ in their attempted description of an event. The southerners
lacked the vocabulary or articulation to use any other adjective than ‘bloody’
and the CBC hosts made fun of that. Was the CBC shut down because of the
impropriety? No, because making fun of white persons is okay. Can you imagine
how racist these hosts must have sounded ‘behind the scenes’ of this broadcast?
If we could have heard their laughter and what they said with mikes turned off,
it should have been deemed as racist as the phrase, ‘Operation Snatch a
Nig-Nog’ (p. 242.) Physicians participate in black humor while performing
surgery when their patients’ lives are on the line. We put up with that.
Paramedics do likewise while doing their
duties. We put up with that. But soldiers, even when their own lives are on the line, are not allowed to do it without
losing their regiment?! Double standards are the norm with run-of-the-mill
jerks in the Liberal camp and their taxpayer-funded supporters at the CBC. We
should tolerate infantry soldiers engaging in black humor and doing the kind of
pranks told about on page 110. The pictures and the video, or the man or men
who released them, might be taken for the cause of the Canadian Airborne being
disbanded. In truth, the cause is the united evil of a political agenda and a
deviant media (p. 319.)
Much space in this paperback is
given to inform us on the legal fallout of Arone’s torture and subsequent
death. Unfortunately, these facts are sprinkled from beginning to end, and
never given to us concisely in one paragraph. Fortunately, there is this loose
summary: “With one exception, every superior convicted in a series of courts
martial got a lighter sentence than the rank below him” (p. 3.) Brown got five
years and was ‘dismissed with disgrace’ (Ibid.) “Obeying an unlawful order was
a greater crime than giving an unlawful order” (p. 214.) Brown got convicted of
manslaughter for ‘a glancing punch’ and a couple of ‘shuffle kicks’ (p. 123)
while the racist Indian mostly to blame got nothing but his own attempted
suicide. This is racism again. And those at the top of the chain where the
negligence and poor decisions about the mission originated from were never held
to account. Evidence intended for presentation at the Somalia Inquiry,
including documents, computer disks, and audio and video tapes, were removed
from his office, says one major. The evidence was to show ‘the intent of senior
command to cover up’ (p. 218.) The inquiry was prematurely shut down in order
to stop the truth from emerging (pp. 3, 4, 274, 322-326.)
The existence of the Airborne
should never have been in jeopardy by a torture, a death, pictures, or a video.
It should never have been in danger of being abolished by the united efforts of
deceptive, whining media and an anti-militaristic administration. But the
soldiers of 2 Commando who let their swagger degrade into bullying and torture
did wrong. The incentive in theatre for troops of any nation to protect their
prisoners rather than torture them is the hope that a reputation for being
decent might redound to their good in the event of being the ones capture the
next time (p. 255.) Rules of engagement now come appended with a clause forbidding
the abuse, torture, and killing of detainees (p. 216.) Psychology assessments
that inmates are subjected to, says Brown from experience in federal prison,
would help to identify future Matchees right at the recruiting office (p. 257.)
Some misjudgments are made in
this book. (1) Undamaged knuckles do not prove that your punches to someone’s
head were not hard (p. 123.) I know a man who cracked a man’s jaw with his bare
knuckles (in self-defense) without marking them up in the least. (2) Worthington believes that
the torture of animals deserves the same amount of justice as the torture of
persons does (p. 2.) Not to speak up for torture of any kind, obviously, but
persons are more to be avenged than animals on the sole ground that they have a
moral nature that brute beasts do not possess. (3) When Worthington and Brown put in the opinion that
the ‘appearance of justice’ is more important than the ‘reality of justice’ (p.
309) they unwittingly argue for what Brown’s sentence and the abolition of the
Airborne amounted to: the ‘appearance’ of, rather than the ‘reality’ of,
justice.
The writing style in Scapegoat fits its content well. “He set
to with enthusiasm and resolve” (p. 307.) This style has the right feel.
‘Chairbound superiors in Ottawa’
(p. 155) is pretty good too. The foul language and cursing should have been
left for readers to intuit, however. A style that alludes to crudity is nobler.
It is more apt, moreover, to immortalize content than a style that informs by
repeating filth verbatim. The authors have it in them to do better than that,
for a time or two they allude rather gracefully, like when “the feathers, so to
speak, were in danger of hitting the fan” (Ibid.) More writing like this, and Scapegoat might not be as widely
forgotten as it is. Grammatical disharmony occurs rarely (pp. 2, 47.) The book
contains about two dozen pictures and two top-notch sketches by Brown.
Some of the content and views
contained in Tarnished Brass come up
again in Scapegoat: the duty
sergeant’s car that got burned by righteously indignant soldiers (pp. 58, 59)
and the evils of a bloated boss-load in the Defense Department with its
‘careerism’ ethic (pp. 307, 308, 319.) But there is not as much overlap as I
anticipated.
PPCLI soldiers from the era that
Brown served in will come across some familiar names in this book. My favorite
mention is that of Eric Miles, the jumpmaster who sorted out Brown’s tangled
equipment just before Brown leaped out of a Chinook (pp. 52, 53.) He was the
most competent, dignified NCO I ever had. Feeding him cigarettes was always a
privilege. I never denied him. He was one of the few NCO’s that every private looked up to and
admired.
About half of this book is about
Kyle Brown’s youth leading up to the Somalia mission and the prison life
and beyond that he faced upon dismissal from the military. Mixed in with the
goods on the Somalia
incident, then, is the story of a man who witnessed the tragic death of his
best friend as a boy (p. 13) and who lost both his father and mother to suicide
as a teenager (p. 6.) We do not realize the traumatic childhood that some of
our fellow soldiers have had to endure on their road to adulthood. He got into
some mischief in his youth, but managed to stay clear of crimes writ large
thanks to Sea Cadets and the like. And judging from the vocabulary he chose to
include in this book, he never got his questions about religion adequately
answered by the time he co-wrote it (pp. 15, 16.) Brown’s view at sixteen that
‘violence was ugly and war insane’ (p. 26) must not have changed upon signing
up or going airborne if it is true that “he had a pacifist bent that made some
NCOs and officers uneasy” (p. 86.) Whatever members of the Airborne think of
Brown after his involvement in what was used as a pretext to bring their
regiment down, they must have been glad, nevertheless, to hear that by virtue
of Brown’s time spent as a Canadian paratrooper, he was respected in prison
(pp. 251, 252.)
For those of us on the outside
who would like to know, life in prison is plush and the food is plentiful and
‘excellent’ (pp. 236, 261.) Quite different from the military’s Detention
Barracks, according to Brown, a man familiar with the quarters and routines of
both. Prison focuses on ‘rehabilitation and reform’; in DB it’s about
‘punishment and privileges’ (p. 229.) Though Brown would disagree, it would do
our criminals good to receive more of the DB treatment than the ‘university
campus, no bars’ atmosphere of prison life (p. 261.)
With respect to the biographical portions of Scapegoat, the moral theme may be
reduced to whether a soldier, if it comes down to having to do it, should
choose to be loyal to his conscience or to his unit (p. 142.) Whether Brown’s
choice had anything to do, or much to do, with the Airborne being disbanded,
which disbanding his tattoo is emblematic of, will remain a subject of dispute
to many a former paratrooper. “One of the first things Brown did when he was
released from prison was to have a ring of concertina wire tattooed on his left
chest” (p. 275.) Considering how standards in the Forces have spoiled in recent
decades, and supposing the Airborne is never resurrected, former paratroopers
can be cheered by the fact that their regiment, being now petrified, is
preserved from the rot.
